Canonical action
A digest of action, system, resource, attributes is the unit of approval, validation and receipt. Seven typed predicates cover amounts, enumeration, windows, rolling sums, co-sign, equality and bounds.
Tokens answer who. agentid answers which agent, on whose behalf, under which exact constraints — and produces evidence a third party can re-derive offline. No vendor service in the verification path.
Five working layers, all in a Go 1.27 standard-library core. Everything below has a test, a CLI path and a document in the repository.
A digest of action, system, resource, attributes is the unit of approval, validation and receipt. Seven typed predicates cover amounts, enumeration, windows, rolling sums, co-sign, equality and bounds.
The agent sees JSON-RPC tools, never credentials. Authority fields come from operator mapping, not tool arguments. Denials return -32000 with a receipt id and an approval request when applicable.
Deny-overrides across profiles, implicit deny, canonical obligation union. Delegations and receipts carry ES256 primary plus ML-DSA-65 post-quantum signatures; approvals must be signed by the approver.
combining →Signed receipts, status lists, customer-chosen anchors, five OTel spans and signer keys travel in one offline-verifiable bundle. A mismatch metric corroborates telemetry against receipts.
bundle →SCIM deprovisioning revokes in bounded time; erasure executors emit deletion receipts; retention archives before pruning; control-plane policy bundles fail closed when stale.
control plane →Every NIST/IETF statement mapped to what is implemented and what is not, with the audit trail of our own corrections.
read the matrix → DEVELOPERClone, go test ./..., run the CLI, inspect a real receipt. No cloud account, no SDK, no hosted service.
Ten threats, control mappings, executable mutants, and measurable success criteria for three design partners.
read the pilot plan →These blocks are generated from the actual Go CLI on every deploy. If the repo drifts, the page drifts with it — visible to anyone who reads the sync script.
evidence bundle VERIFIED (2 receipts, 1 delegations, 0 anchors, 1 status tokens)
Receipts, chains, profiles, anchors, status tokens and keys — verified offline.
FULLY VERIFIED: [ES256 ES256 ML-DSA-65 ML-DSA-65]
ES256 primary and ML-DSA-65 additive signatures checked in one Go verifier.
five spans: delegation.issue, validation, obligation, downstream.call, receipt.persisted reconciliation: agentid.mismatch = 0 propagation: W3C traceparent + agentid authority tracestate PII: subject refs pseudonymous by default
Five spans per action, mutually bound to receipts; divergences raise agentid.mismatch.
erasure plan — subject cust_4471 receipts: 2 · delegations: 1 deadline: 2026-12-21T20:53:22Z (30 days) systems: internal_crm (62 records), zendesk (4 records)
Opaque subject references enumerated from receipts; execution uses real connectors.
Press begin. The journey moves slowly on purpose: a principal issues a credential, an agent carries it, a wrapper holds the downstream secret, and an auditor re-derives the result. Every visible field is captured from a real Go run on deploy.
Go 1.27. Standard-library core. The same commands run in CI on every push.
git clone https://github.com/rajat397/agentid.git cd agentid go test ./... go run ./cmd/agentid demo go run ./cmd/agentid evidence export --demo --out bundle.json go run ./cmd/agentid evidence verify --file bundle.json go run ./cmd/agentid verify-signed --artifact /path/to/cross-artifact.json
agentid — the full lifecycle, running against real Go code 1. Human grants authority: dlg_15e27acdd8ceadf9 (kid demo_signer) 2. Over-cap action: invalid — /attributes/amount max predicate violated (observed 4500.00) (receipt rcp_bd1ab326217eeadc) 3. Within authority: valid (receipt rcp_ba074126fcefe7a8) 4. Four questions: agent=spiffe://example.trust/agent/marketing-agent, subject=oidc|acme-retail|usr_8842, credential=demo_signer, approval=apr_01DEMO 5. Tampered receipt: signatures + hash chain verify: false (receipt[0] signature invalid or kid unknown)
The decision, the evidence and the verification travel together. That is the entire point; the interface is incidental.
NIST's NCCoE concept paper (February 2026) frames agent identity, authorization and audit for federal and critical-infrastructure use. SP 800-63-4 explicitly excludes agents; NISTIR 8587 names the risk. agentid is one runnable public answer — check the standards matrix and the threat model.